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The incident in review was given extensive tri-media (television, media and print) coverage. Major television networks pre-empted their regular programming to cover the incident. Even foreign press correspondents were on the scene in the afternoon of August 23, 2010. There were several aspects of the coverage by the media that are the subject of scrutiny of the Committee. These are: The showing of tactical or strategic footages particularly sniper positions and the assault by the SWAT and subsequently, the augmentation by the SAF; The coverage on the arrest or taking into custody of SPO2 Gregorio Mendoza (brother of the Hostage Taker; The interview over the radio by Radio Mindanao Network (RMN) station DZXL with Michael Rogas as anchorman. The Sniper Positions and the Assault Several footages taken by cameramen of television networks that were aired showed the right side of the bus from the angle of a sniper (taken from behind and showing the rifle pointed to

Establishing the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) The formation of the CMC established the capability to handle the crisis incident. Conversely, the non-establishment of the CMC established the incapability to handle the crisis situation. That a manual has been developed and in place which defines the organizational structure of the CMC emphasizes the importance of convening a CMC. Standard Operating Procedure for a hostage taking requires that the Local Executive (Mayor) of the Local Government Unit (LGU) officially convene the CMC immediately after being informed of the existence of a crisis incident. Mayor Alfredo Lim of Manila claims that having confirmed that MPD Commander, Gen. Rodolfo Magtibay, was already on the scene and acting as Ground Commander and having given instructions to Gen. Magtibay to “cordon-off the area”, inform him of his requirements and “do whatever is necessary”, the Mayor had in effect convened and operationalized the CMC. This

There were Critical Incidents in the chain of events as reconstructed. These Critical Incidents are those points in the chain of events where the action taken, or the inaction, the evaluations and decisions made or omitted, the lapses, that occurred during or resulting from the Critical Incident affected the final outcome of the incident under review. The First Critical Incident First Critical Incident was that the Crisis Management Committee was not activated in accordance with the Manual on the activation of a Crisis Management Committee (CMC). Mayor Alfredo Lim of the City of Manila was the person in authority charged with the duty of activating the CMC. While there was a semblance of a CMC organized by General Magtibay as the Ground Commander, the sub-groups required under the Manual were not activated. As borne by the events as they transpired, this lapse or omission resulted in the inefficiency of, and lack of critical information to make an inform

Forensic Pathology On August 24, 2010 the remains of the hostage-taker and five of the eight dead foreigners were autopsied by the Philippine National Police medico-legal officers. The remaining three were only externally examined “per relatives’ request.” The PNP autopsy reports (mostly 1-page long) do not indicate where these examinations took place. All eight bodies of the foreign nationals were then repatriated to Hongkong the same day. In Hongkong, autopsies with postmortem x-rays were conducted on all the bodies on August 27, 2010 at the Kwai Chung Public Mortuary. The autopsy reports were prepared by pathologists who are officers of the Forensic Pathology Service, Department of Health. Two of these examiners are identified as Specialists in Forensic Pathology (Drs. CHIAO Wing-fu, YING Ho-wan, POON Wai-ming, NG Chung-ki and LAM Wai-kwok). The reports are 4-5 pages long printed on legal size paper containing such det

This report is mainly based on the following: 1 . Affidavits and testimonies of Government and Police Officials and Personnel; 2. Affidavits and testimonies of the released hostages and survivors; 3. Affidavits and testimonies of the hostage-takers’ friends and relatives; 4. Affidavits and testimonies of broadcast news reporters; 5. Documents provided by the resource persons; 6. Documents, Reports and Presentations of the PNP-SOCO, NBI and Hong Kong Police Department; and 7. Ocular Inspections. The report, for lack of material time, does not incorporate forthcoming findings on ballistic tests on bullet fragments subject to manual testing, including those sent to Hong Kong for the ballistic test assistance provided by the Hong Kong Police Department and other forensic tests. The report is likewise limited to case materials available to the forensic pathologist and as such cannot provide certain conclusions were there should be some if proper autopsy, scen

SUMMARY of PROCEEDINGS The Committee started its clarificatory hearings on the August 23, 2010 Rizal Park Hostage-Taking incident on September 3, 2010. First to be called as resource persons were Undersecretary Rico Puno of the DILG, Director General Jesus Verzosa of PNP, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim of the City of Manila and Chairman of the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) for the Rizal Park hostage-taking incident, and PCSupt. (General) Rodolfo Y. Magtibay, formerly District Director of the Manila Police District (MPD) and ground (on-scene) commander for the Rizal Park Hostage-Taking incident and CMC member. On the second day, September 4, 2010, the Committee heard the testimonies of Vice-Mayor Francisco “Isko Moreno” Domagoso of the City of Manila and Vice-Chairman of the CMC, PCInsp. (Major) Romeo Salvador, MPD Assistant Negotiator, Police Director (General) Leocadio Santiago Jr. of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO)